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Abstract 
 
Firms can save considerable money if consumers conserve resources (e.g., if hotel 
patrons turn off the lights when leaving the room, restaurants patrons use fewer paper napkins, or 
airline passengers clean up after themselves). In two studies conducted in real-world hotels, the 
authors show that consumers’ conservation behavior is affected by the extent to which 
consumers perceive the firm as being green. Furthermore, consumer perceptions of firms’ 
greenness and consumer conservation behavior depend on (a) whether the firm requests them to 
conserve resources, (b) the firm’s own commitment to the environment, and (c) the firm’s price 
image. Additionally, firm requests to consumers to save resources can create consumer reactance 
and can backfire when firms themselves do not engage in visible costly environmental efforts. 
Such reactance is more likely for firms with a high price image. Finally, the authors show that by 
spending a little money to signal environmental commitment, firms can save even more money 
through consumers’ conservation of resources, resulting in wins for the firm, the consumer, and 
the environment. 
 
 
Keywords: sustainability, green marketing, corporate social responsibility, price image, reactance 
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 In the current environment featuring climate change, frequent natural disasters, and a 
growing population, firms and consumers both have a keener focus on sustainability. For firms, 
it is increasingly important to be perceived as being environmentally friendly. Salient 
environmental efforts, eco-friendly products, and a green brand image can all be handsomely 
rewarded (Leonidou, Katsikeas, and Morgan 2013; Olsen, Slotegraaf, and Chandukala 2013; 
Peloza, White, and Shang 2013), and may result in higher stock returns for the firm (Sum 2012). 
Accordingly, firms are adopting a wide variety of greener practices. In this research, we examine 
how firms’ environmentally friendly programs can affect consumer perceptions of how green the 
firm is, and how this perception drives consumers’ actual green behavior.  
Many environmental efforts on the part of firms do not entail any cost to the consumer. 
For example, when the firm uses less water, energy, or paper in manufacturing products, it limits 
the quantity of inputs in a product’s creation, and there is no direct cost to consumers. On the 
other hand, when the firm encourages consumers to use less water, energy or paper in the 
consumption of services (e.g., using fewer napkins at a fast food restaurant), it entails a direct 
cost to the consumer in terms of necessitating a change in behavior.  
Our contribution centers on an in-depth examination of the latter case: firm-encouraged 
green behavior where consumers bear some personal cost. When consumers in a hotel forego 
housekeeping, turn off the shower when soaping, switch off the lights when not in the room, or 
bring their own bags to the supermarket, the environmental benefit comes at a “cost” to the 
consumer. Further, in many such cases, there is little or no cost to the firm. To the extent that 
consumers comply with the firm’s request to conserve resources, the firm saves money and also 
helps the environment. For instance, Marriott hotels estimates that it saves between 11 and 17 
percent on water and sewer costs through its hotel towel reuse program (Pellettieri 2009).  
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Even firm programs that offer the consumer something in return for compliant behavior 
can still generate a profit. Delta Hotels’ GreenSTAY program asks consumers to forego 
housekeeping services during their entire stay in return for planting a tree in their name, a $5 
hotel restaurant voucher, or 250 flyer miles; Westin and Sheraton offer a $5 hotel voucher or 500 
hotel points for the same (Hetter 2013). Both offers are financially much smaller than the savings 
to the hotel if the consumer complies with the request -- a room is cleaned in about 30 minutes of 
housekeeping labor per day (Touryali 2013), the vouchers drive incremental sales to the hotel 
restaurants, and many loyalty programs are worth 1-2 cents per mile (Groenewege 2003). 
Thus, we start with the presumption that such “green” programs are designed with two 
firm goals in mind: to foster the perception that the firm is committed to sustainability and to 
increase consumer conservation behavior. Succeeding at the first goal can make the hotel more 
attractive to consumers and also increase consumer conservation behavior (as we show). And, as 
discussed above, achieving the second goal can decrease costs for the hotel. The question we 
explore in this research is how consumers perceive and respond to programs that ask the 
consumer to save resources, but where the firm also benefits if they do so.  
Knowing that firms are highly motivated by the bottom line, some consumers may have 
an especially keen cynicism towards firms when they profess to “do good” or “be 
environmentally friendly”. The very fact that the term “greenwashing” has been coined indicates 
such cynicism is not without merit (Motavalli 2011)1. Furthermore, this skepticism has likely 
been reinforced in consumers’ mind through the media, as commentators have criticized various 
                                                     
1 Greenwashing refers broadly to deceptively promoting the perception that an organization is environmentally 
friendly (Kahle and Gurel-Atay 2014). Interestingly, hotel towel reuse cards were the context for the coining of the 
term, where author Jay Westervelt argued that the firm’s true objective all along was cost savings (Motavalli 2011). 
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social efforts as merely thinly veiled efforts to make more money -- e.g., cause marketing efforts 
(see Frieswick 2009; Krishna and Rajan 2009). As such, it can be expected that when consumers 
observe a firm introduce a new green program that also saves the firm money, consumers may be 
skeptical and question the extent to which the program is truly for the benefit of the environment, 
versus for increasing the firm’s profits.  
We address three main questions in this research: First, can implementing an 
environmentally friendly (“green”) program lead companies to be perceived in a negative light? 
If so, it is important to know when green programs can have negative reputational consequences 
for firms. Second, if a new green program can lead to detrimental reputational problems, how 
can this issue be addressed? Finally, how can green programs be implemented to ensure that they 
will actually increase (rather than potentially decrease) consumers’ actual green behavior? 
 We answer these questions in two studies in real hotels. We show that green programs 
can sometimes lead a company to appear less concerned about the environment, an effect more 
likely to occur for high price image firms. Next, we show that a way to overcome this problem is 
by demonstrating to consumers that the company has voluntarily invested its own (financial) 
resources in its efforts to be more pro-environmental. Importantly, we show that, executed 
effectively, green programs can increase consumer conservation efforts and liking for the firm, 
and also reduce the firm’s costs – thus resulting in a win for the firm, the consumer, and the 
environment. However, when executed ineffectively, green programs can backfire and actually 
reduce conservation, increase firm costs, as well as produce negative reputational effects. 
Finally, we demonstrate the psychological process underlying consumers’ response to firm 
requests. Specially, we show that under some conditions, a request by the firm to conserve 
resources can create consumer reactance to such messaging, which negatively impacts both 
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consumers’ beliefs about how green the firm is and consumer conservation behavior. We also 
document a relationship between consumers’ perceptions of the firm’s greenness and their 
conservation behavior. Our research contributes to both theory and practice, and we believe it 
can help marketers execute better green programs that benefit the environment, improve their 
reputation, and help their bottom line.  
The next section presents our theoretical background and conceptual development. We 
then report two studies in real hotels that test our theorizing. We conclude with a discussion of 
the findings and highlight implications for practice and directions for future research. 
 
LITERATURE REVIEW AND CONCEPTUAL BACKGROUND 
 
Sustainable Consumption  
Marketing researchers have called for more research into sustainability (e.g., Mick 2006), 
and research focusing on towel reuse at hotels (Goldstein, Cialdini, and Griskevicius 2008), 
environmentally friendly products (Griskevicius, Tybur, and Van den Bergh 2010), and recycling 
(Trudel and Argo 2013) has garnered attention. Research has found that consumer reactions to 
green offerings can be highly varied. While some consumer segments are willing to pay more for 
sustainable offerings, others are not (e.g., Haws, Winterich, and Naylor 2014; Menon and Menon 
1997). In one example, Trudel and Cotte (2009) show that people are sometimes willing to pay 
more for ethically produced goods, but consumers can also punish firms (by demanding lower 
prices) for goods seen as unethical.  
However, negative consequences of sustainable offerings have also been found. For 
example, Luchs and colleagues (2010) show that consumers associate sustainable (vs. 
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conventional) products with greater gentleness and lower strength. As such, consumers have a 
lower desire to purchase sustainable products when strength is a preferred attribute. In a similar 
vein, Luo and Bhattacharya (2006) find that for firms low in innovativeness, social initiatives (or 
CSR) can harm customer satisfaction and hurt firm market value. Finally, Newman, Gorlin, and 
Dhar (2014) show that consumers perceive a tradeoff facing firms in their product 
improvements, whereby “greening” a product takes away from its perceived product quality. 
But, interestingly, consumers view new products with green enhancements as being lower in 
quality only when the firm “proactively” created a green product, and not if it was an 
“unintended” side effect.  
In general, while consumers report caring about the environment, there exists a wide gap 
between their attitudes and actual behavior (e.g., Auger and Devinney 2007; Carrington et al. 
2010). As White and Simpson (2013, p. 78) state quite succinctly, “An issue that arises in 
contexts of sustainable consumption behaviors is that consumers often tend to resist engaging in 
activities that involve some cost to the individual-level self (e.g., additional time, increased 
effort, behavioral change), despite their goal of promoting a more societal, other-focused good 
(e.g., more sustainable practices and outcomes).” In other words, consumers often resist 
changing their behavior to promote sustainable efforts when it entails effort on their part.  
 
Motivating Conservation Behavior  
Some prior research has focused on nudges and well-constructed pleas to increase 
consumer conservation behavior (e.g., Cornellissen et al. 2008; Griskevicius, Tybur, and Van 
den Bergh 2010; Thøgersen 2005). For instance, Baca-Motes and colleagues (2013) show that 
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guests who are asked to pledge their commitment to the environment and wear a pin symbolizing 
this commitment are much more likely to re-use their towels in a hotel.  
Kronrod, Grinstein, and Wathieu (2012) find consumers respond better to assertive 
messages (e.g., “everyone must use more public transportation!”) than non-assertive messages 
(e.g., “everyone could use more public transportation.”), but only if they believe the 
environmental issue to be important. In hotels specifically, Goldstein and colleagues (2008) 
demonstrate that the extent to which a firm’s message matches consumers’ current situational 
circumstances predicts the latter’s actual conservation behavior. In other words, being told that 
others in the same room reused their towels is more effective than being told a larger group or 
more meaningful group (e.g, other hotel guests, others of their same gender) did so.  
 
Backfire effects of conservation pleas.  Some research suggests that pleas to increase consumer 
conservation behavior can “backfire” and increase consumption. For example, Schultz and 
colleagues (2007) document that messages informing consumers that they are using less power 
than their neighbors caused some households to increase their power usage (rather than decrease 
it further). Similarly, Catlin and Wang (2013) found that when consumers were provided 
convenient recycling options (vs. none), they increased their resource usage -- paper in one 
study, and paper hand towels in another. In a fair trade context, White, MacDonnell, and Ellard 
(2012) show that communicating high need when requesting consumer prosocial actions can 
backfire. For instance, in one study, when there was a high need (producers’ conditions were 
unjust) but the item had low potential for justice restoration (only a small portion of the proceeds 
went to the producers), participants showed less desire for such products compared to when the 
need was more modest. 
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The explanations for these results are diverse, ranging from social norms (Schultz et al. 
2007), licensing (Catlin and Wang 2013), and justice sensitivity (White et al. 2012). We add to 
the literature on such backfire effects by showing another source of potential backfire to 
consumer pleas by firms, namely consumer reactance. Further, we document when such 
reactance is more likely to manifest in response to conservation appeals. 
 
Reactance 
 What is reactance?  Reactance is a resistance to persuasion (Brehm 1966, 1972; Hong 
1992) – specifically, a resistance in changing one’s beliefs or behavior. Per Brehm’s theory, 
messages that are perceived by consumers as reducing their personal freedoms (for example, 
choosing to drink or smoke) arouse the motivational state of reactance, which directs individuals 
toward changing their beliefs about the messenger and re-establishing the lost freedom.  
In the context of consumer-firm interactions, reactance is grounded in a desire to reassert 
freedom that is allegedly restricted when a firm sends a message to consumers and “tells” them 
to think or behave in a certain fashion (Brehm 1966, 1972; Clee and Wicklund 1980; Kivetz 
2005; Fitzsimons and Lehmann 2004). In terms of beliefs, it can mean, for example, a resistance 
to changing one’s perception about how “good” a firm is. Thus, consumers may not let firm CSR 
messaging change their beliefs about how good the firm is. Behaviorally, reactance can mean 
engaging in activities that are in direct contrast to what is being asked by the firm. 
Reactance has been illustrated very clearly by Bensley and Wu (1991) in a study of 
alcohol prevention ads. In their study, they showed participants either high threat ads (with terms 
such as ‘‘conclusive evidence’’, ‘‘any reasonable person must acknowledge these conclusions’’) 
or low threat ads (with terms such as ‘‘good evidence’’ and ‘‘you may wish to consider these 
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conclusions carefully”); consistent with reactance theory, participants evaluated the high threat 
messages more negatively. Further, these messages also had a boomerang effect in that they led 
the participants to have greater intentions to drink (compared to low threat messages). In a follow 
up study on downstream effects, participants who saw the high (versus low threat ads) drank 
more beer in a taste test. Thus, certain kinds of alcohol prevention ads increased alcohol 
consumption (instead of decreasing it), an effect attributed to reactance.  
As reactance works on both beliefs and behaviors, in our context, a consumer could react 
to both the notion that a hotel touts its environmental commitment and to the firm’s request that 
consumers conserve resources. A firm request may lead consumers to focus on the profit-
perspective of the firm and perhaps infer more sinister (“greed”) motives for the request rather 
than conservation motives.  
Accordingly, in a hotel context, notes with requests to consumers (e.g., “please help save 
the environment”) could result in such a tension -- on one hand, the note could have a positive 
effect on perceptions of the hotel’s greenness, and consumers may comply with the request by 
increasing their conservation behavior (a direct response to the plea). However, the note could 
also have a negative effect with perceptions of the hotel’s greenness being reduced, and 
consumers reducing their conservation behavior (an indirect response to the plea, via reactance).  
Reactance and firm commitment and price. For our specific hypothesis relating 
reactance to consumer response to firm requests, we draw on three streams of literature which 
make a similar prediction: that consumers are more likely to respond to the firm’s request if the 
firm is also perceived as putting in green effort. 
First, the literature on dual entitlement indicates that when consumers decide on how 
much effort to put in, they also look at how much effort the firm is putting in (e.g., Kivetz and 
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Simonson 2002, 2003; Reczek, Haws, and Summers 2014). Consumers believe that both 
themselves and the firm are entitled to fair processes and outcomes (Haws and Bearden 2006). 
As consumers and firms are engaged in a series of exchanges, consumers look to the efforts of 
firms, and reward them accordingly (Morales 2005).   
Second, work on social norms and reciprocity (e.g., Cialdini 2009) suggests that 
consumers view the firm as being effortful in being green, they will be more motivated to do 
their part. This is because effort on the part of the firm triggers a sense of obligation on the part 
of the consumer.  
Third, the CSR literature suggests that CSR efforts are interpreted in light of various 
characteristics of the firm (e.g., Bhattacharya and Sen 2004; Luo and Bhattacharya 2006). For 
example, consumer beliefs about a firm’s value system and its products can affect consumer 
perceptions of the firm’s CSR initiatives, with incongruities having the potential to hurt the 
firm’s sales (e.g., Newman, Gorlin, and Dhar 2014; Sen and Bhattacharya 2001).  
All three literatures streams above point to firms’ “actions” being more motivating to 
consumers rather than firms just “talking about” being green. In our hotel context, there are 
several possible cues a firm can use to signal its environmental values. These may include 
sustainability targets, sustainability reports, visible pledges, or visible conservation efforts. 
Perhaps the most obvious from a consumer’s standpoint is visible conservation efforts on the part 
of the firm. However, not all conservation programs are equal: the consumer can readily infer 
some as being cost saving (e.g., asking consumers to conserve towels), and others as costing 
money (e.g., offering electric car charging stations). In other words, some programs “tell” 
consumers to help save, while others “show” a firm’s commitment to sustainability. Clearly, 
behaviors that are costly are stronger evidence of commitment. 
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As such, we expect consumers will engage in more actual green behavior when they 
perceive a firm to be more “green”, and that these perceptions will be influenced by cues of the 
firm’s environmental efforts. When a firm makes a request to consumers to conserve, the 
presence of other cues suggesting that the firm is also doing so should increase consumers’ 
perceptions of the firm’s greenness and influence consumer conservation behavior. However, the 
same request is likely to invoke reactance – decreasing perceptions of the firm’s greenness and 
reducing conservation behavior – when there are no signs that the firm is also conserving 
resources and putting money behind the conservation effort. The aforementioned firm behavior 
may be interpreted as hypocrisy, and can be damaging to the brand (Wagner, Lutz, and Weitz 
2009). Such “empty” requests are also likely to be interpreted by consumers as persuasion 
attempts, activating their skepticism and persuasion knowledge, and generating counter-arguing 
(Friestad and Wright 1994; Campbell and Kirmani 2000), thus backfiring.  
Besides lack of visible conservation effort by the firm, when else is reactance more 
likely? Reactance should be particularly likely when firms have a high price image (i.e., how 
cheap or expensive customers perceive the firm to be; Zielke 2006), since consumers may feel 
that they have paid for the right to behave as they see fit. Specifically, as a consumer pays more, 
the more freedom she should (perceive) she has to do as she wants. When her “freedom” to make 
these decisions is threatened, via firm requests to conserve, she may be more likely to feel 
reactance (i.e., feel the firm is less green and behave contrary to the request). Even if she is not 
paying personally, a high price sets an expectation (Zeithaml 1988). Since the high price firm is 
charging more, a consumer may also expect the firm to take care of conservation without 
expecting help from them (“when they are charging so much, don’t they have the money to be 
green?”), and may perceive requests for the consumer to do so as petty (“why should I do the 
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work, if it’s just saving them money?”).  This incongruence should cause resistance to the idea 
that the firm is environmentally friendly and decrease consumers compliance with the firm’s 
request. Thus, once consumers start questioning the firm’s environmental efforts (i.e., once 
skepticism and metacognition are aroused), it will be more detrimental for the high price firm in 
terms of reactance, green perception and conservation behavior.  
A second reason why firm price should be associated with reactance relies on the 
legitimacy of the firm request. Reactance is a feeling of having one’s beliefs or behaviors 
externally manipulated or induced (Brehm 1966). Brehm suggests that one entity’s interference 
in another’s freedom creates less reactance if the interference is justifiable and legitimate. When 
might firm requests be more legitimate? We contend that when the firm engages in costly green 
efforts itself, this justification is more legitimate. The justification is also legitimate when the 
firm does not have the resources to engage in its own costly green efforts (i.e., the low price 
firm) and does not do so. However, if the hotel has capabilities (i.e., if the hotel has a high price), 
but does not engage in its own green efforts, such requests are unjustified, and the likelihood of 
reactance is high.  
Note, however, that green products frequently have higher prices (Dale 2008), which may 
also result in the reverse inference being made by consumers, namely that high price products are 
more green (e.g., Lee and Schwarz 2012). Consumers readily make inferences about product 
attributes in the absence of incomplete information (Chernev and Carpenter 2001; Deval et al 
2013) and the more expensive a firm is, the more resources consumers should infer it has to 
invest in the environment. Thus, all else being equal, however, we expect that high price firms 
will be perceived as being greener than low price firms; and, in the absence of other cues, 
consumers should a firm’s price as a cue of its greenness.  
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For ease of explication, we refer to “costly visible effort by the firm to help the 
environment” as visible-firm-effort, a request by the firm to the consumer to engage in resource 
conservation as firm-request, price image of the firm as firm-price-image; consumer perception 
of the firm’s greenness as green-perception, and actual resource conservation by the consumer 
(in the context of interacting with the firm) as consumer-conservation-behavior. We propose: 
H1: Consumer conservation-behavior will be positively related to perceptions of a firm’s 
greenness. 
H2: When there is no visible-firm-effort, a firm-request is likely to create reactance, 
especially when firm-price-image is high; when there is visible-firm-effort, a firm-
request will not result in such reactance, irrespective of firm-price-image [i.e., there 
is a 3-way interaction between visible-firm-effort, firm-request and firm-price-image 
on reactance].   
As discussed above, we expect consumer reactance to impact both perceptions of 
greenness and consumer conservation behavior, and H1 suggests that perceptions of greenness 
impact conservation behavior. Thus:  
H3: When there is a firm-request to the consumer to conserve resources, reactance to this 
request mediates the interactive effect of firm-price-image and visible-firm-effort on 
green-perception; green-perception then affects consumer conservation-behavior 
[i.e., there is a serial mediation process]. 
As discussed earlier, when firms request consumers to make conservation efforts and 
there is no reactance by consumers, then the request can increase consumer conservation 
behavior (direct effect of a firm-request); however, when there is reactance, then the request can 
decrease such conservation behavior (indirect effect of a firm-request).  
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H2, H3, and the direct and indirect effects of a firm-request together imply that:  
H4: When there is no visible-firm-effort, a firm-request is likely to decrease green 
perception and decrease conservation, especially when firm-price-image is high. 
However, when there is visible-firm-effort, a firm-request will increase green-
perception and conservation-behavior, irrespective of firm-price-image [i.e., there is 
a 3-way interaction between visible-firm-effort, firm-request and firm-price-image 
on (a) consumer perceptions of the firm’s greenness, and (b) actual resource 
conservation by the consumer].   
Our conceptual framework is given in figure 1. Studies 1 and 2 together test this 
framework. Both studies focus on the context of hotels. In study 1, we examine electricity 
savings. If hotels are able to convince patrons to turn off the lights, the hotel’s expenses decline 
and profits increase. While the interests of the firm and the environment are aligned in such 
cases, the burden falls on the consumer to conserve resources. As hotels across the world use 
billions of dollars of electricity (much of which still comes from coal), a reduction in usage is 
clearly good for society. The study is done in the field (in real hotels) and tests H1 and H4, 
where consumers’ actual green behavior (electricity usage) is measured non-intrusively. Study 2 
tests H1 and H4 with a real hotel serving as a laboratory. Additionally, in this study, we test the 
process underlying consumer response to the hotels’ request to conserve resources – we examine 
the role of consumer reactance (H2 and H3).  
 
STUDY 1: FIELD STUDY -- HOTEL ROOM ELECTRICITY  
 
Participants and Design 
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The study utilized a 2 (firm-price-image: high price vs. low price) × 2 (firm-request for 
consumer effort: note vs. no-note) × 2 (visible-firm-effort: effort-absent vs. effort-present) 
between-subjects design, and took place in partnership with a hotel chain and a large corporation. 
Participants (N = 281) were employees of a large Chinese E-Commerce corporation who were 
participating in the company’s quarterly training workshop. Participants were assigned to one of 
two hotels according to workshop themes, which are not relevant to the study. Importantly for 
our study, the two hotels, while under the same parent brand name, differ substantially in price. 
The high price hotel charges about 768RMB (about USD $125) per night, while the low price 
hotel charges approximately 228RMB (about USD $37) per night for a standard room. Web 
Appendix A provides photos of the bathroom and bedroom of the two hotels2.  
Within each hotel, firm-request and visible-firm-effort were randomly assigned. Thus, 
our study has elements of both a quasi experiment (the hotel price was not randomly assigned) 
and a conventional field experiment (firm-request and visible-firm-effort were randomly 
assigned). To manipulate firm-request for consumer effort, we had a note and a no-note 
condition. In the note condition, at the main power buttons we placed small notes (one near the 
door of bedroom, one near the bed). These notes read: “To save the environment, we encourage 
you to save electricity. Please turn off air-conditioning, kettle, lights, TV, etc. when not in use”. 
This request had a footnote saying “Please set the thermostat above 25oC when cooling” and 
“Please set the thermostat below 20oC when heating” (see Web Appendix B for the note used).3 
                                                     
2 360-degree videos of the hotel rooms are available at 
https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCjvcHEjG66cGVpf8ZnpA0bg/videos. Additional photos and videos of the 
hotel rooms are available upon request. 
3 We focus on individual benefit appeals (such as "you can help"; e.g., White and Simpson 2013) and not on 
injunctive ("you should do this") or descriptive appeals ("most people do this") (e.g., Cialdini, Reno, and Kalgren 
1990; Fisher and Ackerman 1998; Schultz et al. 2007, Nolan et al. 2008; Goldstein et al. 2008). However, our theory 
tests the interaction between price, firm request appeals, and efforts on the part of the firm, and the role of reactance. 
Theoretically, our model should apply to other appeal types as well. The fact that reactance can be activated by 
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The thermostat settings of 25oC (77oF) and 20oC (68oF) are common benchmarks suggested by 
numerous hotels in China. When this study was carried out, the outside temperature was 24-34oC 
(75-93oF). We expected participants to use air conditioning in their room when the temperature 
was as warm as it was, and this was necessary to observe variance in the degree of electricity 
usage across participants. Signage in most Chinese hotels is bilingual (Chinese and English), as 
was this note. In the no-note condition, the note was absent.  
To operationalize presence and absence of visible-firm-effort, we used a costly, 
environmentally friendly item (bamboo toothbrush for effort-present), and less costly, 
environmentally unfriendly item (plastic toothbrush for effort-absent). The toothbrush made of 
bamboo was placed in a recycled paper box package; the regular plastic toothbrush was in a 
plastic sleeve package (as is the standard practice in local hotels; see Web Appendix C for 
photos). The bamboo toothbrush signaled that the hotel was committed to environmentalism and 
was willing to spend for it; it cost approximately four times more than a regular plastic 
toothbrush.4 We refer to the effort-present and effort-absent conditions as bamboo and plastic, 
respectively.  
All participants stayed in individual rooms. To minimize participants in the note and no-
note conditions from visiting each others’ rooms, we placed them on different floors.  
 
Materials and Procedure 
                                                     
perceived firm hypocrisy should also be true if instead of an individual appeal, a different type of messaging was 
used, but the request is incongruent with the asker’s behavior. 
4 A between-subjects laboratory pre-test with 58 participants from a Hong Kong university confirmed that the 
bamboo toothbrush was perceived to be both more costly (Mbamboo= 4.59 (SD = 1.02) vs. Mplastic = 2.10 (SD = 1.05), 
F(1, 56) = 83.81, p < .01) and more environmentally friendly (Mbamboo= 4.97 (SD = 1.35) vs Mplastic = 2.34 (SD = 
1.05), F(1, 56) = 68.41, p < .01), compared to the plastic toothbrush, both perceptions assessed on 7-point scales 
(i.e., “the toothbrush is… ‘expensive’ (1 = strongly disagree, 7 = strongly agree), ‘environmental’” (1 = strongly 
disagree, 7 = strongly agree). 
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Participants checked into their hotels on the evening of day 1. They were out of their 
rooms for their workshop during day 2 until the evening. On the morning of day 3, all 
participants attended a concluding session of the workshop, where they were asked by the 
company to take a survey about the hotel, and then take a separate survey about the workshop. 
The first survey contained several measures (detailed below), and had a cover story stating “The 
event planner looked at various hotels before choosing one. Now we want your feedback about 
this hotel”. The second survey was not related to our study. After completing the survey, 
participants checked out of the hotel. See Web Appendix D for the logistical details for the study.  
 
Measures  
Below are the measures we collected from the survey, presented in the order they were 
collected in the survey, plus conservation-behavior. As green-perception was the first measure 
collected in the survey and electricity usage obtained from the hotel after the experiment, these 
two key variables cannot be affected by other variables measured in the survey.   
Dependent variables:  
Green-perception.  We used a four-item measure (α = .89) for green-perception (“in my 
opinion, the hotel is... ‘committed to helping the environment’, ‘making a difference’, ‘is doing 
environmentally friendly practices’, ‘is committed to sustainability’”, each assessed on a seven-
point scale (1= not at all, 7 = very much). We computed the average of the four items and used it 
as the measure of green-perception (M = 4.41, SD = 1.49).  
Conservation-behavior. From each room’s smart meter, we collected actual electricity 
usage (“usage” in Kilowatt hours), from 10 a.m. on day 2 till 10 a.m. on day 3 (i.e., for a 24-hour 
period). This actual usage (M = 4.91, SD = 1.83) was the measure of conservation-behavior. In 
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addition, we collected daily-level electricity usage of each room for an additional 30 days: 15 
days prior to our experiment and 15 days afterwards. By averaging the electricity usage over this 
30-day period, we computed a daily “benchmark usage” for each room, in Kilowatt hours. This 
benchmark usage (M = 5.23, SD = .94) was later used as a covariate in ANOVAs and 
regressions, to control for room-specific idiosyncrasies, such as room size, direction of exposure, 
or efficiency of the electrical equipment. 
Manipulation checks. We asked all participants to estimate the price of the hotel to assess 
if the price image manipulation worked as intended. To assess whether the firm-request 
manipulation worked as intended, participants were asked if they had seen the note located near 
the main power buttons. We did not ask people in the no-note condition whether they had seen a 
note (we felt that this could result in demand effects). In addition, we asked participants to guess 
what material the toothbrush in the bathroom was constructed from, and what they thought about 
the toothbrush (i.e., “the toothbrush is … ‘expensive’,  ‘environmental’” (both 1 = strongly 
disagree, 7 = strongly agree). Asking participants to rate the toothbrush on these dimensions after 
their own environmental behaviors had been observed, rules out measurement activating 
concepts that could have influenced their subsequent behavior, inadvertently or deliberately. 
Demographic variables. We also obtained basic participant demographic information 
directly from their employer, including sex (66% men), age (M = 33.36 (SD = 5.77), education 
(67% college and above), and years of working (M = 11.33 years (SD = 6.44))5. None of the 
demographics varied significantly by condition (ps > .15).  
 
                                                     
5 We find that participants with a college degree or above tend to perceive the hotel as less green, compared with 
participants who do not go to college (Mcollege =4.22 (SD = 1.54) vs. M no college = 4.79 (SD = 1.29), F(1,273) = 9.28, p 
< .01). We do not find any other significant correlations between the demographic variables and electricity usage. 
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Results 
Manipulation checks.  As expected, the estimated price of the high price hotel was greater 
than that of the low price hotel (Mhigh-price = 824 RMB (SD = 106) vs. Mlow-price = 217 RMB (SD = 
42); F(1, 279) = 3935.11, p < .01). All the participants in the note condition reported seeing the 
thermostat note, suggesting that these manipulations worked as intended.  
In the plastic toothbrush condition, all participants reported that the toothbrush was made 
of plastic. In the bamboo toothbrush condition, 135 of 141 participants reported that the 
toothbrush was made of bamboo (4 said “wood”, 1 said “plastic”, and 1 said “cannot 
remember”). We dropped these 6 participants from the analyses of this study, but their inclusion 
does not meaningfully impact our results. As expected, the bamboo toothbrush was perceived as 
being more expensive (Mbamboo = 5.53 (SD = 1.03) vs. Mplastic = 2.47 (SD = 1.05), F(1, 273) = 
594.32, p < .01) and more environmentally friendly (Mbamboo = 5.41 (SD = 1.00) vs. Mplastic = 
2.55 (SD = 1.02), F(1, 273) = 548.60, p < .01) compared to the plastic toothbrush, with both 
means also significantly different than the mid-point of the scale (ps < .05). Hence the 
manipulation of visible-firm-effort worked as intended. 
Dependent variables: 
Green-perception. An ANOVA with firm-price-image, firm-request, and visible-firm-
effort as independent variables and green-perception as the dependent variable revealed a 
significant main effect of firm-price-image (F(1, 267) = 168.06, p < .01) and visible-firm-effort 
(F(1, 267) = 119.79, p < .01). The main effect of firm-request was not significant (F(1, 267) = 
1.50, p = .22). The main effect of firm-price-image showed that the high price hotel (Mhigh-price = 
5.20 (SD = 1.17) was seen as being more green than the low price hotel (Mlow-price = 3.59 (SD = 
1.33)), which is consistent with what we expected based on the more green-higher price 
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marketplace correlation, as well as an affordability argument (a high price hotel can afford to be 
green). The significant main effect of visible-firm-effort suggests that if a firm visibly spent 
money on green effort, it was perceived as being greener (Mbamboo = 5.10 (SD = 1.17)) compared 
to one that does not (Mplastic = 3.74 (SD = 1.45)), which serves as another manipulation check. 
We also found significant two-way interactions between firm-price-image and firm-
request (F(1, 267) = 4.79, p < .05), firm-price-image and visible-firm-effort (F(1, 267) = 9.37, p 
< .01), and firm-request and visible-firm-effort (F(1, 267) = 9.49, p < .01). However, these 
effects were qualified by a significant three-way interaction (F(1, 267) = 6.69, p < .01). 
Decomposing the three-way interaction: when there was no visible-firm-effort (plastic 
toothbrush condition), we found a significant firm-price-image × firm-request interaction, as 
predicted by H4 (F(1, 267) = 11.62, p < .01; see figure 2 for means). Consumers perceived the 
high price hotel as being significantly less green when it placed a note suggesting patrons save 
electricity as compared to when it did not (Mnote = 4.16 (SD = 1.28) vs. Mno-note = 5.27 (SD = 
.84), F(1, 267) = 21.03, p < .01). However, for the low price hotel, firm-request did not change 
green-perception (Mnote = 2.79 (SD = .89) vs. Mno-note = 2.74 (SD = .95), F < 1).  
[figure 2 about here] 
On the other hand, when there was visible-firm-effort (bamboo toothbrush condition), the 
firm-price-image × firm-request interaction was no longer significant (F < 1) and only a 
significant main effect of firm-price-image emerged (Mlow-price = 4.47 (SD = 1.13) vs. Mhigh-price = 
5.68 (SD = .89), F(1, 267) = 48.13, p < .01). The main effect indicates that the high price hotel 
was perceived as being more green than the low price hotel – whether or not it placed a note 
urging consumers to save electricity. Thus, the price image effect on green-perception holds 
when firms have visible signals that they are earnest about the environment and put money 
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behind such efforts – and this happens even when the hotel urges consumers to conserve energy. 
Together, the results for conservation behavior support H4.  
Conservation-behavior: Total effect. We collected the actual electricity usage across 
participants (M = 4.91 (SD = 1.83), min = 1.65, max = 10.18) for the predetermined 24-hour 
period of their stay (higher numbers reflect more usage and lower conservation). An ANCOVA 
on electricity usage with firm-request, firm-price-image, and visible-firm-effort as independent 
variables, and benchmark usage for each room as a covariate showed a marginally significant 
main effect of visible-firm-effort (F(1, 266) = 3.442, p = .065), suggesting that consumers tended 
to use less electricity (conserve more electricity) when the hotel had visible costly environmental 
effort versus not (Mplastic = 5.13 (SD = 1.84) vs. Mbamboo = 4.67 (SD = 1.80). There was also a 
significant two-way interaction between firm-request and visible-firm-effort (F(1, 266) = 4.52, p 
< .05), and a marginally significant three-way interaction between firm-price-image, firm-request 
and visible-firm-effort (F(1, 266) = 2.913, p = .089). No other effects were significant (ps > .20). 
See figure 3 for the means of electricity usage across conditions. 
[figure 3 about here] 
Decomposing this three-way interaction, in the bamboo toothbrush condition, we observe 
that the firm-request to save electricity (note condition) reduced actual electricity usage (Mno-note  
= 4.98, SD = 1.90 vs. Mnote = 4.36, SD = 1.66; F(1, 266) = 4.26; p < .05), irrespective of the price 
image of the hotel – i.e., there was no interaction effect between firm-price-image and the firm-
request to save electricity (F < 1). For the high price hotel, electricity usage averaged 4.84 
Kilowatt hours in the note condition (SD = 1.82) and 5.52 Kilowatt hours in the no-note 
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condition (SD = 1.93); for the low price hotel, electricity usage averaged 3.86 Kilowatt hours in 
the note condition (SD = 1.33) and 4.37 Kilowatt hours in the no-note condition (SD = 1.69)6.  
In contrast, in the plastic toothbrush condition, we found a significant interaction effect 
between firm-price-image and firm-request (F(1, 266) = 4.05, p < .05), again supporting H4. 
Specifically, a firm request (note condition) did not significantly reduce electricity usage in the 
low price hotel (Mno-note = 4.78 Kilowatt hours (SD = 1.71) vs. Mnote = 4.46 Kilowatt hours (SD = 
1.72), F < 1), and seemed to backfire and significantly increased electricity usage in the high 
price hotel (Mno-note = 5.25 Kilowatt hours (SD = 1.70) vs Mnote = 6.04 Kilowatt hours (SD = 
1.92), F(1, 266) = 4.18; p < .05). We interpret these results as suggestive of the importance of 
consistency between a company’s own green behavior and that which it asks its customers to 
engage in. Consumers acted greenest when they observed the firm also doing so.   
Direct and indirect effects of firm-request on conservation-behavior (moderated-
mediation model). The results discussed above are the overall (total) effects of our three factors 
on conservation-behavior. However, these total effects can be broken into direct and indirect 
effects, which may be in opposite directions. On one hand, consumers could comply with the 
message on the note, and resource usage may decrease (Direct effect, represented by the dotted 
line connecting firm request and conservation behavior in figure 1). On the other hand, when the 
firm does not engage in visible green efforts but asks the consumers to do so, it can lower green-
perception for the high price firm, which could negatively impact resource conservation (Indirect 
effect, represented by the solid line in figure 1). We tested these two potential drivers of 
conservation-behavior (i.e., actual electricity usage) in mediation analyses. 
                                                     
6 After controlling for benchmark usage, we found no significant main effect of price on actual electricity usage in 
Kilowatt hours (p = .62). The seemingly higher electricity usage in the high (vs. low) price hotel is a function of 
reporting raw electricity usage, which does not account for the fact that the high price hotel had larger rooms, more 
powerful ACs, and additional electronics.  
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First, we found that green-perception mediated the effect of the three-way interaction on 
conservation-behavior. A pathway analysis7 revealed that the three-way interaction predicted 
green-perception (B = .16, p < .01), which then predicted electricity usage in the full dataset (B = 
-.66, p < .01, the latter supporting H1). The bootstrapped 95% confidence interval did not include 
zero (-.2025, -.0311), supporting mediation (see figure 4).   
[figure 4 about here] 
We next conducted a test of each factor in the model.8 Examining the signs of the 
coefficients for each factor gives more insight into the direct and indirect effects of firm-request. 
Looking at the direct effect, we found that firm-request (i.e., the note) directionally reduced 
electricity usage in the full sample, but the effect was not significant (B = -.11, p = .26, 95% CI: -
.3028, .0834). Next, we examined the indirect effect of firm-request on electricity usage 
separately for the plastic and bamboo toothbrush conditions. In the plastic toothbrush condition, 
a firm-request by the high price hotel led to a lower level of green-perception, which increased 
actual electricity usage (B = .24, 95% CI: .1272, .4184), i.e., the indirect effect of firm-request 
(through green-perception) backfired and reduced conservation. However, firm-request had no 
impact on conservation for the low price hotel (B = -.01, 95% CI: -.1171, .0812). In the bamboo 
toothbrush condition, the indirect effect of firm-request (through green-perception) was not 
significant, either in the high price (B = -.06, 95% CI: -.1669, .0245) or the low price hotel (B = -
.04, 95% CI: -.1721, .0754). Thus, the negative indirect effect of firm-request was only seen in 
the high price hotel with the plastic toothbrush. In sum, the results clearly identify two paths, one 
direct, and the other indirect, to consumers’ conservation behavior.  
                                                     
7 PROCESS (Hayes 2013) macro, model 4, controlling for all lower order effects and benchmark usage. The 
correlation between green perception and actual usage is r = -.18 (p <.01); controlling for benchmark usage, this 
value is r = -.35 (p < .01).   
8 PROCESS (Hayes 2013) model 11, controlling for benchmark usage. 
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Discussion 
 Study 1 demonstrates that consumers’ perceptions of a firm’s greenness are directly 
related to consumer conservation behavior (H1). Further, the study shows that both consumer 
perceptions and behavior depend in part on the actions taken by the firm (such as suggesting its 
patrons reduce electricity usage), but also on corroborating evidence that the firm is committed 
to the environment, and on the price image of the firm. Interestingly, all else being equal, high 
price firms are viewed by consumers as greener than low price firms. Here, we demonstrate the 
reverse inference. Further, the interactive effect of firm-price-image and firm-request on actual 
conservation behavior supports the notion that high and low price image firms are viewed 
differently when they ask consumers to conserve resources that save the hotel money: high price 
firms are seen as less green for doing so, whereas there is no significant change in perception of 
the low price firms. In showing that green perceptions guide actual conservation behavior, we 
identify two important and competing effects. While the hotel’s note may induce consumers to 
save electricity, it may ironically backfire at a high price hotel, making the hotel look relatively 
less green, which increases consumer’s actual electricity usage.   
Cost savings for firms when they request consumer green effort.  Although consumers 
used less electricity in many cases when the hotel used a bamboo toothbrush (versus a plastic 
one), the former costs the hotel more money per unit. Does this investment pay off? In other 
words, when a firm engages in costly environmental effort to show commitment, can it still save 
money overall due to the associated reduction in resources used by consumers? This was 
empirically testable in our data. By using a bamboo toothbrush instead of a plastic toothbrush in 
the note condition, the high price hotel saved, on average (per room), 1.2 Kilowatt hours per 24-
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hour period, equal to a savings of 1.8 RMB. The low price hotel saved 0.6 Kilowatt hours per 
day, or a savings of 0.9 RMB. The wholesale price of a bamboo toothbrush is 1 RMB per unit, 
and that of a plastic toothbrush is 0.2 RMB per unit. Hence, by using a bamboo toothbrush, the 
high price hotel actually saved 1.8 - (1 - 0.2) = 1 RMB per room per night, and the low price 
hotel saved 0.9 - (1.0 - 0.2) = 0.1 RMB. Given the low margins in the hotel industry, these 
numbers correspond to a 0.9% profit increase for the high price hotel and 0.3% profit increase 
for the low price hotel9. This finding is important since we document an intervention that can 
lead to an optimal outcome for firms, as well as for the environment.  
 
STUDY 2: LABORATORY STUDY IN A REAL HOTEL – ROLE OF REACTANCE 
 
Our second study had two objectives. First, we sought to replicate the first study in a 
setting where participants were asked to conserve resources in multiple ways. Second, we wished 
to explore the role of reactance to the two firm goals: to be seen as green (attitude or perception) 
and to drive consumer conservation (behavior or intent). To maintain realism, we used actual 
hotel rooms as our laboratory. This is especially important when trying to invoke reactance, since 
reactance requires participants to feel engaged with the task. Also, we expected our 
manipulations (i.e., price image, firm request, and firm’s costly effort) to be more salient in a real 
hotel room, where participants see real prices and actual props (e.g., a bamboo toothbrush) in the 
room. However, similar to conventional laboratory studies, we could still randomly assign 
(similar) participants to conditions and maintain full experimental control.  
                                                     
9 According to the 2012 financial report of this hotel chain, the average net profit margin (i.e., profit / price) per 
room per night is 14.2%. The price of the hotel room is 768 RMB (228 RMB) for the high (low) price hotel; thus, 
profit can be estimated at 109 RMB (32RMB) per night. A 1 RMB (0.1 RMB) savings would increase profit 
margins by approximately 1 / 109 = 0.9% (0.1 / 32 = 0.3%) in the high (low) price hotel.  
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Participants and Design 
This study used the same 2 (firm-price-image: high price vs. low price) × 2 (firm-request 
for consumer effort: note vs. no-note) × 2 (visible-firm-effort: effort-absent vs. effort-present) 
between-subjects design as study 1. Undergraduate college students (N = 548) from a major 
Hong Kong university were recruited, paid HKD $150, and randomly assigned to one of the 
eight conditions. The hotel rooms were located in separate hotels – a high price one and a low 
price one; the two hotels are located in the same district of downtown Hong Kong. 
Similar to the electricity study, firm-price-image was manipulated by the hotel’s actual 
price. The low price hotel charges HKD $380 (about USD $49) per night, while the high price 
hotel charges HKD $2500 (about USD $322) per night, for a standard room. Web Appendix E 
provides photos of the bathroom and bedroom of the two hotels10. 
Within each hotel, we employed two manipulations conceptually identical to the previous 
study, but with multiple cues for strength of manipulation and generality. To manipulate firm-
request, we had a note and a no-note condition, similar to our earlier study. In the note condition, 
we showed three cards in the room. First, a card in the bathroom read, “To save the environment, 
we encourage you to reuse your towels. Please drop unwanted towels on the floor” (see Web 
Appendix F). Second, we used a note about foregoing housekeeping on the bed, which read, “Be 
part of our energy savings program. Forgo daily housekeeping services during your stay and help 
us save our forest and natural habitats” (see Web Appendix F). Third, similar to the previous 
                                                     
10 360-degree videos of the hotel rooms are available at 
https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCfBUwxUIoE0Tg1d2kEkd73g/videos. Additional photos and videos of the 
hotel rooms are available upon request. Because of the variation in room availability in the high price hotel across 
time, 107 (out of 269) participants were assigned to a room with two beds, 162 (out of 269) were assigned to a room 
with one bed. The prices of the two types of room are the same and there is no significant difference in the 
dependent variables (ps > .65) between the two types. 
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study (see Web Appendix B), we used a note about saving electricity – this was placed at the 
main power buttons (one near the door of bedroom, one near the bed). Signage in Hong Kong 
hotels is bilingual (Chinese and English). All of these requests were modeled after real-world 
equivalents from actual hotels. In the no-note condition, no cards were placed in the room. 
To manipulate visible-firm-effort, we used four signals. In the visible-firm-effort present 
(absent) conditions, 1) we used a bamboo toothbrush (a regular plastic toothbrush) in the 
bathroom; 2) on the bedroom tea table, we placed a hotel welcome cookie on a china plate (on a 
disposable plate); 3) next to the plate, we placed two china cups (two disposable plastic cups), 
and 4) we used toiletry bottles with an accompanying sign saying, “toiletry bottles are 
biodegradable and earth friendly; 100% recyclable materials” (no such sign). We expected that 
these props signaled that the hotel is committed (vs. not committed) to environmentalism at its 
own expense.11. For ease of explication, we call the two conditions bamboo-toothbrush-etc. and 
plastic-toothbrush-etc. conditions. 
 
Materials and Procedure 
Participants were recruited through an advertisement for a study purportedly on academic 
research about consumer hotel experiences. They were told they would be taken to a real hotel 
room and then provide their opinions about the hotel. On the day of the experiment, each 
participant was sent an email with the name of the hotel that they should visit and were met by a 
research assistant in the hotel lobby. In the lobby, they were told the hotel’s room price for a 
single night (either HKD $2500 or HKD $380, depending on condition), and that they would 
                                                     
11 A between-subjects laboratory pre-test with 47 participants from a Hong Kong university confirmed that each of 
the props in the costly environmental commitment condition was perceived to be both more costly and more 
environmentally friendly as compared to each in the commitment absent condition (ps < .01; “…is expensive”, “…is 
environmental” (both 1 = strongly disagree, 7 = strongly agree).  
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now visit the room. They were given the following other instructions at this point: “Imagine that 
you are spending YOUR OWN money on the room and you are staying in this hotel room for 
three nights. Please explore the bedroom and bathroom. You will then be asked a few questions 
about your opinions about the hotel room.” Participants then visited a room individually, and 
were given a survey containing our key measures to complete in the room while the research 
assistant waited outside.12 Participants were paid and dismissed after completing the survey. 
 
Measures   
Dependent variables: Below, are the three dependent measures we assessed; they are 
presented in the same order as in the survey. 
Conservation-intention. We measured a suite of five green behaviors relevant to hotels: “I 
intend to forego housekeeping services during my stay”, “I will definitely tell housekeeping not 
to bother cleaning my room each day”, “I will re-use my hotel towels”, “I will save electricity 
during my stay at this hotel”, “I will set the AC at a warmer temperature to conserve power”, 
each assessed on a 9-point scale (“strongly disagree” to “strongly agree”, α = .93; M = 5.62, SD 
= 2.05). We utilized these items to capture consumers’ general intentions to conserve.13  
Green-perception. We used a four-item measure for green-perception, identical to the one 
used in study 1 (α = .83; M = 4.28, SD = 1.43). 
                                                     
12 We measured the time when a participant went into the room and the time when (s)he left. We computed the time 
of staying in the room (in minutes) by taking the difference of the two time points (Mean = 11.53, SD = 2.55, Min = 
4.58, Max = 18.88). Importantly, time does not differ across manipulated conditions; nor does it predict green 
perception or conservation intention (ps>.30). 
13 We acknowledge that some of these items are more abstract than others. For example “set the AC at a warmer 
temperature” does not specify a temperature. Given the considerable variation in temperature preferences, we 
thought it best to assess conservation relative to an individual’s personal benchmark, rather than an objective 
standard. The exclusion of this item does not impact our results.    
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Reactance. In the note conditions (i.e., the conditions in which participants were asked to 
forgo housekeeping, save electricity, and reuse towels), we explicitly measured participants’ felt 
reactance to the hotel’s resource conservation requests – this was done using a three-item scale 
(sample item: “I felt like the hotel was trying to make me do what it wanted”, 1 = strongly 
disagree, 7 = strongly agree) borrowed from Fitzsimons, Moore, and Zemack-Rugar (2014) and a 
four-item scale (sample item: “thinking about the hotel environment signs… the advice restricted 
my autonomy to choose”, 1 = completely disagree, 7 = completely agree) from Dillard and Shen 
(2005). The two scales were highly correlated (r = .91), loaded on a single factor (all 
loadings >.74, first eigenvalue explains 77% of variance), and were highly reliable as a single 
measure (α = .94). Hence, we computed the average of the items, and used it as our measure of 
reactance (M = 3.42, SD = 1.34)14. It was impossible to assess reactance in the no-note condition 
because such measures have no context in such a case (there is nothing to react to if there is no 
request by the hotel). Web Appendix H shows the measures in full.   
Other measures. We asked participants their overall liking for the hotel using a 9-point 
scale (M = .41, SD = 2.45) (-4 = very negative, 4 = very positive), and their willingness to stay at 
the hotel again using a 9-point scale (M = -.12, SD = 2.20) (-4 = not at all, 4 = very much). We 
also measured trait-reactance (an individual difference measure of an individual’s propensity for 
reactance) using Hong’s revised eleven-item, five-point trait reactance scale (α = .83; M = 3.15, 
SD = .61; sample items: “I become angry when my freedom of choice is restricted” and “I 
become frustrated when I am unable to make free and independent decisions”, 1 = strongly 
disagree, 5 = strongly agree, Hong and Faedda 1996; see Web Appendix H for the measures in 
full). Finally, we obtained basic participant demographic information, including sex (43% men), 
                                                     
14 For ease of interpretation, we use the simple average of the items of the two scales. An alternate way to construct 
the measure is to standardize scale scores before taking the average. That method produces identical results.  
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age (M = 20.07 years, SD = 1.34), years of speaking English (M = 16.62 years, SD =1.75). None 
of the demographics varied significantly by condition (ps > .15).  
Manipulation checks. We asked all participants to estimate the price of the hotel. To 
assess the hotel’s commitment to the environment, participants in the note condition were asked 
if they had seen each of the three notes in the hotel room. We did not ask people in the no-note 
condition whether they had seen notes (we felt that this could result in demand effects). In 
addition, we asked participants to guess what material the toothbrush in the bathroom was made 
from, what kind of plate this hotel used for the welcome cookie, what kind of cup the hotel used, 
and whether they saw a sign for the toiletry bottles in the bathroom (and what the sign stated).  
 
Results 
Manipulation checks.  As expected, the estimated price of the high price hotel was greater 
than that of the low price hotel (Mhigh = $2491 HKD (SD = 63) vs. Mlow = $379 HKD (SD = 13); 
F(1, 546) = 30140, p < .01). In the note condition, 274 out of 278 participants reported seeing at 
least one note. Finally, 534 out of 548 participants correctly reported seeing at least one of the 
props (toothbrush, cookie plate, cup, and the note for toiletry bottle). Hence the manipulations 
worked as intended. In the subsequent analyses, we excluded the 15 participants who either 
incorrectly identified any of the props or reported not seeing any note in the note condition, but 
their inclusion does not materially change our results or conclusions.  
Dependent variables: 
Green-perception. An ANOVA with firm-price-image, firm-request, and visible-firm-
effort as independent variables and green-perception as the dependent variable revealed a 
significant main effect of firm-price-image (F(1, 525) = 97.71, p < .01) and a significant main 
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effect of visible-firm-effort (F(1, 525) = 258.31, p < .01). The main effect of firm-price-image 
showed that the high price hotel (Mhigh = 4.76 (SD = 1.46) was seen as being more green as 
compared to the low price hotel (Mlow = 3.82 (SD = 1.23)). The significant main effect of visible-
firm-effort suggested that if a firm visibly spends money on green effort, it was perceived as 
more green (M = 5.03 (SD = 1.15)), compared to one that did not (M = 3.52 (SD = 1.27)). These 
two main effects replicate those in study 1.  
We also found a significant two-way interaction between firm-request and visible-firm-
effort (F(1, 525) = 12.25, p < .01), and a marginally significant two-way interaction between 
firm-price-image and firm-request (F(1, 525) = 3.79, p = .052). Importantly, these effects are all 
qualified by a significant three-way interaction between firm-price-image, firm-request and 
visible-firm-effort (F(1, 525) = 11.77, p < .01, see figure 5 and Web Appendix G for descriptive 
statistics by condition. 
[figure 5 about here] 
Decomposing the three-way interaction: in the plastic-toothbrush-etc. condition, we 
found the same firm-price-image × firm-request interaction pattern observed in our previous 
study (F(1, 525) = 14.28, p < .01). Consumers perceived the high price hotel as being 
significantly less green when it placed notes suggesting patrons conserve resources as compared 
to when it did not place the notes (Mnote = 3.50 (SD = 1.47) vs. Mno-note =4.46 (SD = 1.18), F(1, 
525) = 25.37, p < .01). However, for the low price hotel, firm-request did not change green-
perception (Mnote = 3.08 (SD = 1.03) vs. Mno-note 3.02 (SD = .72), F < 1). These effects fully 
replicate the previous study’s results and support H4. 
 In the bamboo-toothbrush-etc. condition, the firm-price-image × visible-firm-effort 
interaction was no longer significant (F (1, 525) = 1.11, p > .25) and only a significant main 
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effect of firm-price-image emerged (Mlow = 4.57 (SD = 1.05) vs. Mhigh = 5.51 (SD = 1.06), F(1, 
525) = 50.19, p < .01), suggesting the high price hotel was perceived as being more green than 
the low price hotel – whether or not it placed a note urging consumers to conserve resources. 
Thus, when a firm showed it was earnest about the environment and put money behind such 
efforts, consumers perceived it as more green, supporting H4. 
Conservation-intention. An ANOVA on conservation-intention with firm-price-image, 
firm-request, and visible-firm-effort as independent variables showed a significant main effect of 
visible-firm-effort (F(1, 525) = 263.30, p < .01), suggesting that consumers intend to conserve 
more when the hotel shows visible-firm-effort (Mbamboo  = 6.71 (SD = 1.70) vs. Mplastic = 4.49 
(SD = 1.76). The ANOVA also revealed a significant main effect of firm-price-image, 
suggesting a higher green behavioral intention for the high price versus the low price hotel 
(Mhigh-price = 6.17 (SD = 2.08) vs. Mlow-price = 5.06 (SD = 1.88)). There was also a significant two-
way interaction between firm-request and visible-firm-effort (F(1, 525) = 30.37, p < .01). 
Importantly, there was also a significant three-way interaction between firm-price-image, firm-
request and visible-firm-effort (F(1, 525) = 10.08, p < .01), with descriptive statistics shown in 
figure 6 and Web Appendix G.  
[figure 6 about here] 
Decomposing this three-way interaction, in the bamboo-toothbrush-etc. condition, a firm-
request (note condition) increased conservation-intention (Mnote  = 7.13 (SD = 1.64) vs. Mno-note = 
6.30 (SD = 1.66; F(1, 525) = 18.27; p < .01), irrespective of the price image of the hotel. As 
predicted by H4, no interaction effect between price and the firm request to be green was 
observed (F(1, 525) = 2.14, p > .10). In contrast, in the plastic-toothbrush-etc. condition, 
requesting people to be green (note condition) did not increase conservation-intention in the low 
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price hotel (Mno-note = 3.94 (SD = 1.29) vs. Mnote = 3.84 (SD = 1.50), F < 1), and backfired 
(significantly decreasing) conservation-intention in the high price hotel (Mno-note = 5.73 (SD = 
1.67) vs. Mnote = 4.45 (SD = 1.87), F(1, 525) = 21.39; p < .01). In other words, we observed a 
significant interaction effect between firm-price-image and the firm-request (F(1, 525) = 9.17, p 
< .01), supporting H4. These results are also fully consistent with study 1. Again, we can 
interpret these results as suggestive of the importance of consistency between a company’s own 
green behavior and that which it asks its customers to engage in.  
Direct and indirect effects of firm-request on conservation-intention (moderated-
mediation model). As in study 1, the direct and indirect effects of firm-request (the note) on 
conservation-intention may be in opposite directions and are explored using mediation analyses.  
First, we again found that green-perception mediated the three-way interaction of firm-
price-image, firm-request, and visible-firm-effort, on conservation-intention. A pathway analysis 
using the same model as in study 1 revealed that the three-way interaction significantly predicted 
green-perception (B = .16, p < .01), and that green-perception significantly predicted 
conservation-intention, in the full dataset (B = 1.05, p < .01, the latter again supporting H1). The 
indirect effect revealed mediation (95% CI: .0749, .2743; see figure 7). 
[figure 7 about here] 
As in study 1, we then examined the effects of each factor in the model using moderated 
mediation. Looking at the direct effect, we found that firm-request increased conservation-
intention in the full sample (B= .11, p = .03, 95% CI: .0099, .2033). Next, in order to test the 
effect of visible-firm-effort, we again examined the indirect effects of firm-request on 
conservation-intention separately for the two visible-firm-effort conditions. First, in the plastic-
toothbrush-etc. condition, asking consumers to reserve resources in the case of the high price 
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hotel led to a lower green-perception, which decreased conservation-intention (B = -.58, 95% CI: 
-.8662, -.3158), an effect not present in the low price hotel (B = .03, 95% CI: -.1487, .2213). In 
the bamboo-toothbrush-etc. condition, the indirect effect of firm-request on conservation-
intention (through green-perception) was no longer significant, either for the high (B = .21, 95% 
CI: -.0044, .4253) or low price hotels (B = .04, 95% CI: -.1757, .2650). These results are 
consistent with the previous field study (where we measured actual behavior). 
Reactance as the underlying mechanism. Our model proposes that consumers can 
experience reactance to both firm goals: being seen as green and getting consumers to conserve, 
with the former also predicting the latter. We first explored whether reactance was the process 
driving perceptions and intent. If reactance is the underlining process, we should observe two 
data patterns in the note conditions. First, reactance should be negatively correlated with green-
perception and conservation-intention. As expected, reactance was significantly negatively 
correlated with both green-perception (r = -.59, p < .01) and with conservation-intention (r = 
-.59, p < .01). Second, we should observe an interaction pattern between firm-price-image and 
visible-firm-effort on reactance, showing that there is a larger effect of costly commitment in the 
high versus low price hotel. Indeed, in addition to the significant main effects in the expected 
direction for both firm-price-image (F(1, 259) = 37.96, p <.01) and visible-firm-effort (F(1, 259) 
= 202.14, p <.01), their interaction was also significant (F(1, 259) = 6.20, p =.01). The pattern of 
means revealed a stronger effect of visible-firm-effort on reactance in the high price hotel 
(Mplastic = 4.05, SD = 1.04; Mbamboo = 2.07, SD = .88) as compared to the low price hotel (Mplastic 
= 4.49, SD = .97; Mbamboo = 3.10, SD = .97). Together, the evidence suggests that the interaction 
of price and visible firm effort drives reactance, and reactance drives both perceptions and intent. 
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Next, we tested for the indirect effect of firm-request on conservation behavior through 
reactance and green-perception (H2 and H3), i.e., we tested for the serial mediation shown in our 
conceptual framework (figure 1). As expected, the two-way firm-price-image x visible-firm-
effort interaction predicted reactance (B = -.15, p = .01), reactance predicted green-perception (B 
= -.29, p < .01), and green-perception predicted conservation-intention (B = 1.06, p = < .01; see 
figure 8). Further, the indirect path was significant with the 95% confidence interval not 
containing zero (CI: .0109, .1044). However, there remained no significant direct pathway from 
reactance to conservation-intention (B = -.01, p = .83) after the effect from reactance to green-
perception was also estimated, likely given the strong correlation between green-perception and 
conservation-intention (r = .83 in the full data, r = .88 in the note condition, both ps < .01). As a 
robustness check, we also specified an alternative mediational pathway, where reactance was the 
outcome of green-perception, rather than an antecedent to it (i.e., flipping the order of the 
mediators). Such a model fit significantly poorer, and did not indicate mediation (CI: 
-.0040, .0066). While documenting “true” causation in all of our model’s pathways is impossible 
given that reactance, green-perception and conservation-intent are all measured at the same point 
in time and none is manipulated, it appears that consumers’ conservation-intent is a function of 
both their reactance to the firm’s request and their green-perception, but the unique effect of each 
is not readily separable in our paradigm. 
[figure 8 about here] 
Reaction to persuasive messages to result in reactance is frequently construed as a 
situational response. However, Brehm (1966) suggests that individuals may differ in their 
potential for reactance, and subsequent research also finds this (Hong, Giannakopoulos and 
Laing 1994; Hong and Page 1989). In this study, we also measured trait-reactance for all 
37 
 
participants. While the state reactance items focus more on behaviors than attitudes, the trait 
scale is much more balanced. Another way to test for reactance as a process is to examine the 
effect for those high versus low in trait-reactance; if there are differences between such groups, it 
would point to our effects being due to reactance.  
An ANOVA of trait-reactance (M = 3.15, SD = .61) on the three manipulated factors 
revealed no main effect or interaction effects (ps > .25), suggesting that the individual difference 
variable was not contaminated by our manipulations. First, we observe a four-way interaction 
between our three manipulated factors and trait-reactance on both green-perception (B = 1.65, p 
< .01) and conservation-intention (B = 2.43, p < .01). Our theory would suggest that trait-
reactance should moderate the effect of firm-request in the plastic-toothbrush-etc. condition, but 
this should not be the case in the bamboo-toothbrush-etc. condition. Consistent with this, the 
three-way interaction is significant in the former case (green-perception: B = 1.98, p < .01; 
conservation-intention: B = 2.47, p < .01), but not in the latter case (green-perception: B = .22, 
p > .60; conservation-intention: B = .04, p > .95).  
Next, we conducted a spotlight analysis within the plastic-toothbrush-etc. condition. 
Specifically, we examined the magnitude of the indirect effect of firm-request on conservation-
intention at three levels of trait-reactance: at the mean, and +/- 1 SD from it. In the case of the 
high price hotel, the indirect effect was strongly negative at +1 SD on trait-reactance (B= -2.63, 
95% CI: -3.3141, -2.0117), weakened somewhat at the mean point (B= -1.04, 95% CI: -1.4795, 
-.6132), and diminished to a nonsignificant level at -1 SD (B = .55, 95% CI: -.1042, 1.1989). 
This pattern suggests that when the high price hotel has no visible green effort, people of higher 
trait-reactance are more attuned to perceiving the hotel as less green, and hence have a lower 
intention to be green -- supporting our framework. The indirect effect was not significant in the 
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low price hotel. In sum, in the absence of firm’s visible costly green efforts, the backfire effect of 
a firm request in the high price hotel becomes accentuated when consumers are of high trait-
reactance (and diminishes when trait reactance is low), but green-perception at low price hotels 
is not affected by trait-reactance. These results provide strong conceptual support for the 
hypothesis that reactance is the underlying process for our results. 
 Other measures.  We find that overall liking of the hotel is positively correlated with 
green-perception (r = .66, p < .01) and with conservation-intention (r = .58, p < .01). In addition, 
we find that the willingness to stay at the hotel again is also positively correlated with green-
perception (r = .56, p < .01) and with conservation-intention (r = .48, p < .01). These results 
suggest that our findings on firm-request and visible-firm-effort are managerially important, not 
only because the hotel’s image and consumers’ conservation behavior may be affected, but also 
because revenue may be affected by these factors. 
 
Discussion 
Study 2 replicates the results of the previous field study (H1 and H4) in a laboratory 
setting where participants were asked to conserve resources in several ways that necessitated 
effort or inconvenience. In addition, the study shows reactance as the driving process for green-
perception (H2 and H3). We found that, in the absence of firms’ visible environmental efforts, 
consumer reactance was strongly related to both perceptions of greenness and consumer 
intentions to engage in environmentally friendly behaviors. Further, this study again shows that 
consumers are likely to behave in more sustainable ways when they observe the firm doing so; 
however, requests from the firm (especially a high price firm) can backfire when the firm is not 
“putting its money where its mouth is”. Finally, this study contributes by showing there are other 
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reputational consequences to the firm of acting green. We show that liking of the hotel, as well 
as willingness to return to the hotel, are strongly related to how green it is perceived. Thus, it 
further underscores the importance to the firm of managing consumer perceptions, and how 
conservation programs may sabotage consumer green behavior, hurt a firm’s reputation, and 
undermine profits. However, executed correctly, we show that a firm’s green reputation can be 
strengthened, and it can effectively promote consumers to conserve resources. 
 
GENERAL DISCUSSION 
 
 Firms engage in many environmental actions, some of which require consumer 
participation and also save money for the firm. In our examination of such cases, we show the 
execution of such programs can affect both consumer judgments of the firm and actual 
conservation behavior.  
We motivated the research with three questions: (1) can implementing a “green” program 
lead the company to be perceived in a negative light? (2) if so, how can this problem be 
addressed, and (3) how can such programs be implemented to ensure consumers participate? We 
provide answers to each of these questions. First, we show that there are potential negative 
reputational consequences to such programs, especially for high price firms; second, we show 
this problem can be addressed by visible (costly) evidence of the firm also expending effort on 
environmental efforts; and third, that programs should always couple their requests to consumers 
with proof that the firm is also exerting effort. We also show that reactance is a part of the 
underlying process of consumer response to firm programs, driving both consumer perceptions 
and consumer behavior.  
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We identify a crucial moderator that drives whether a firm request leads to favorable 
perceptions and consumer green behavior: namely, what consumers can observe of the firm’s 
own efforts to help the environment. We also contribute to the literature on reactance by 
identifying a new and practically useful antecedent: visible commitment to the requested act by 
the requester. We show that when there are clear signals that the firm is spending its own 
financial resources in conservation efforts, reactance and unfavorable attributions from such 
requests are mitigated. In addition, under such circumstances, we find that actual consumer 
conservation increases. Further, even though the firm must spend money on environmental 
efforts to create optimal conservation programs, overall the firm can still save money in doing 
so. However, if the only “green” act a consumer sees is the firm asking her to expend effort, we 
show that a host of negative perceptions can be activated and compliance can decrease.  
At first blush, our results stand in contrast to those of Newman et al. (2014). Newman et 
al. (2014) show that if firms intentionally (vs. unintentionally) help the environment, consumers 
can be less receptive to the product. At some level, our findings show the opposite: that signaling 
commitment by the firm is key to positive consumer response. Our findings are different from 
Newman et al.’s in three key ways. First, our context is one where consumers’ effort is required 
for the environment to benefit; in their context, the firm exerts all of the effort. The literature on 
dual entitlement, effort, and reciprocity consistently shows this distinction is crucial for how 
consumers view firm actions. Second, we focus on consumption, while they focus on inputs. 
While both are clearly important from an environmental perspective, the focus on consumption 
changes often necessitates action from both firm and consumer. Third, their work does not 
examine price (or cost) issues. Given the importance of this issue to both firms and consumer 
sides, we believe its inclusion in our work is offers a meaningful advance.       
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Many questions still remain on consumer response to firm requests. We show that firm 
efforts must cost money and also be visible to the consumer, but our work cannot speak to how 
visible or exactly how costly such actions need to be. Visibility to consumers clearly is a 
continuum, but even “back office” functions can be better highlighted. While no consumer 
typically sees the eco-friendly laundry detergent a hotel uses, a firm could make this more salient 
to its patrons, by talking about it, or by placing a small sample in the room.   
One finding of the research here shows that high price firms are consistently perceived as 
greener than their low price counterparts. It is interesting in itself that mere price positioning of a 
firm can trigger inferences (and perhaps expectations) about how socially responsible it is. This 
is a robust consumer perception in our data, but is there any real-world truth to it, i.e., are high 
price firms indeed more green? Also, in forming these perceptions, what other cues do 
consumers use? Specifically, are there certain cues that activate suspicion, persuasion 
knowledge, or counter arguing in the domain of green acts (e.g., Darke and Ritchie 2007, 
Kirmani and Campbell 2004)? Might differences in staff caliber, training, or behavior affect 
consumer metacognition? Understanding what triggers these attributions is crucial if firms are to 
design communications that effectively address them. 
In addition, it would be interesting to examine how and why the link between price image 
and environmental responsibility, regardless of its veracity, originates and perpetuates. We 
proposed two reasons for the link – first, we suggest that green products are generally more 
expensive, and consumers may make the reverse inference – that high prices products (and 
firms) are more green. Second, consumers may believe that “greenness” is not a core product 
benefit, but is a frivolous expense that only high price firms can afford – hence, high price hotels 
may be more likely to be perceived as being green. Consumers may believe that low price firms 
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do not have money available to invest in “extras” like environmental benefits; and, when they do 
so, consumers may even perceive them as providing a lower value for the money. On the other 
hand, Chernev and Blair (2015), show that companies can be rewarded for CSR efforts in non-
core areas, so long as the motive is deemed to be benevolent (as compared to financial interest). 
Their findings are consistent with our study 2 results, where we show a similar spillover effect to 
the one they find: namely, that consumers’ liking of the hotel and intentions to return are 
positively associated with perceptions of its motives.  
The logic of how firm price might dictate consumer response can also be applied to 
asking consumers to go green. When a firm explicitly asks consumers to save the environment 
(and thus save the firm money), such an act can be seen as tacky when done by a high price firm. 
On the other hand, this request may not be out of place at a low price establishment. To the 
contrary, it may perfectly fit their core brand image of offering low prices, since saving enables 
them to do so. In fact, what if a low price firm’s plea was “help us save money”, rather than 
“help us save the environment”? Might this honesty pay off for them and encourage consumer 
conservation behavior? Future research should test such a speculation.  
In closing, we hope that this research will spur further investigation into environmental 
efforts, perceptions and behaviors, with a view towards increasing environmental efforts both on 
the part of consumers, as well as on the part of firms.  
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Figure 1  
CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 
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Figure 2 
STUDY 1: GREEN-PERCEPTION AS A FUNCTION OF FIRM-PRICE-IMAGE, FIRM-
REQUEST AND VISIBLE-FIRM-EFFORT*
 
* Error bars represent ±2 standard error of mean. 
Figure 3 
STUDY 1: ELECTRICITY USAGE IN KILOWATT HOURS AS A FUNCTION OF FIRM-
PRICE-IMAGE, FIRM-REQUEST AND VISIBLE-FIRM-EFFORT*15 
 
* Error bars represent ±2 standard error of mean. 
Figure 4 
                                                     
15 Figure 3 plotted the raw electricity usage in Kilowatt hours without controlling benchmark usage (i.e., 30-day 
room average usage). In the data reported in the paper, we controlled benchmark usage to account for room specific 
factors, such as room size, direction of exposure, efficiency of the electrical equipment, etc. In addition, using the 
ratio “actual usage / benchmark usage” as alternative DV yielded similar results to what we reported in the paper.  
Visible-Firm-Effort Absent (Plastic toothbrush) Visible-Firm-Effort Present (Bamboo toothbrush)  
Visible-Firm-Effort Absent (Plastic toothbrush) Visible-Firm-Effort Present (Bamboo toothbrush)  
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STUDY 1: MEDIATIONAL MODEL 
 
 
 
+ p < .10, * p < .05, ** p < .01; unstandardized coefficients reported. 
 
Figure 5 
STUDY 2: GREEN-PERCEPTION AS A FUNCTION OF FIRM-PRICE-IMAGE, FIRM-
REQUEST AND VISIBLE-FIRM-EFFORT*  
 
* Error bars represent ±2 standard error of mean. 
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Figure 6 
STUDY 2: CONSERVATION-INTENTION AS A FUNCTION OF FIRM-PRICE-IMAGE, 
FIRM-REQUEST AND VISIBLE-FIRM-EFFORT* 
 
* Error bars represent ±2 standard error of mean. 
 
Figure 7 
STUDY 2: MEDIATIONAL MODEL (FULL DATA SET) 
 
 
 
+ p < .10, * p < .05, ** p < .01; unstandardized coefficients reported. 
 
Figure 8 
STUDY 2: SERIAL MEDITATIONAL MODEL (NOTE CONDITION ONLY) 
 
 
 
+ p < .10, * p < .05, ** p < .01; unstandardized coefficients reported. 
c’ (.01)  
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